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
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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Luncheon Meeting with Raphael Angel Calderon, President of Costa Rica

PARTICIPANTS: The President
The Vice President
James A. Baker III, Secretary of State
John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Robert M. Gates, Assistant to the President and Deputy for National Security Affairs
Bernard W. Aronson, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs
Luis Guinot, Jr., U.S. Ambassador to Costa Rica
William T. Pryce, Senior Director, Latin American Affairs, NSC (Notetaker)

Rafael Angel Calderon, President
Arnoldo Lopez, Second Vice President
Bern Niehaus, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Thelmo Vargas, Minister of Finance
Roberto Rojas, Minister of Trade
Gonzalo Facio, Ambassador to the United States
Rodolfo Jimenez, Advisor to the President
Armando Gonzalez Fonseca, Advisor to the President

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: October 10, 1991, 12:25 - 1:15 pm, D.S.T. Old Family Dining Room

The President: On Haiti, we have been worried of sending U.S. forces. The last few days things have become more complicated. There is no question that Aristide is the democratic elected leader, but there is opposition and there are charges against him. We just don't know what will happen. Assistant Secretary Aronson and of course the secretary of State have followed the situation more closely. We don't know what you think about the situation. Carlos Andres Perez was certainly very highly charged up at the beginning, but I think perhaps he has pulled back little bit. (C)

President Calderon: I share your view. We hear of abuses and of human rights violations, ***** by President Aristide. But there are ways to insure that if he goes back, the problems will not be repeated. We think it is very important for the whole

western hemisphere that we do something to ensure the continuance of Democracy. This is the first time almost all of the hemisphere is democratic. I don't know if he --- or --- you might be able to do something. We are obliged to give a lesson to the countries of the hemisphere that democracy will be supported. We all prefer that the measures should be peaceful--sanctions, blockades, and others, but, if we think we'll work with peaceful means, I think that a multilateral force could go in to Haiti, but with the full backing of the Organization of American States. (C)

The President: Yes, we would want to have the full OAS backing, but the trouble is, they work by consensus don't they? (C)

President Calderon: No. It only requires a two-thirds ***** (C)

The President: Maybe Secretary Baker or Bernie Aronson would want to say something. (C)

Secretary Baker: Bernie has been following this twenty four hours a day. It's probably better to have him speak. (C)

Assistant Secretary Aronson: Foreign Minister Niehaus and I went down to Haiti. We found that with the elite: the army, the parliament, and Aristide, we could probably come to a solution, but that the enlisted men would not agree. (C)

The President: Were they part of a movement lead by Cedras? (C)

Assistant Secretary Aronson: No. I did not get the feeling that was the case. If we put our sanctions and they work this would be a victory for the OAS. But, the other possibly is, it could lead to violence or chaos. (C)

The President: Is there a leader of the enlisted personnel? (C)

Assistant Secretary Aronson: There is a Major who seems to have some status. But, I would say that no one is really in charge. (C)

The President: The precedent, which is set by the Organization of American States is very important. (C)

Foreign Minister Niehaus: I think that what the President said is true. It provides a precedent for what might happen with other countries. It is very important that we demonstrate that democracy has support, if not, what is happening in Haiti could happen in Guatemala, El Salvador, or Peru. This is proof that the OAS can function well. I don't see an easy solution. There is of course, the problem of human rights. (C)

The President: Yes. He is now staying in Venezuela. What is the next step? (C)

Assistant Secretary Aronson: The sanctions will take effect. The hope that the next step would be that the new government comes back to say we are now here to negotiate, and then maybe, we could achieve our purpose. But, it might also be, that the sanctions ***** and the country becomes beset by anarchy. (C)

Secretary Baker: That is the greater risk. (C)

General Scowcroft: The sanctions don't really hurt the army. (C)

Assistant Secretary Aronson: We must accept that arms cut off could hurt them, but they may get arms from the Dominican Republic. Mr. President, I've never seen the OAS working together better than it has in this situation. I don't know if the Foreign Minister agrees. (C)

Foreign Minister Neihaus: Yes. (C)

The President: Is anything going on in the United Nations? (C)

Assistant Secretary Aronson: Aristide wanted the U.N. to deal with the problem, but India and others on the Security Council didn't want the Security Council to deal with a situation, which they consider to be an internal matter. I think the General Assembly will take action in the next day or so. (C)

President Calderon: I think it is important for you and all friends of democracy to coordinate closely. And we are prepared to cooperate. We are all moved by the same principle. (C)

The President: I certainly hope it comes out all right. (C)

Perhaps Secretary Baker would like to talk little about the Middle East. This will be his final trip. (C)

Secretary Baker: The fourth final trip. In Moscow, the Soviets suggested that we would have a meeting in November. October 20 is the drop date in order to make proper preparations. This is a difficult situation. You probably need to say at some point, okay, here is what we will be able to arrange. Here is the letter of assurance. Will you come or not. (C)

As the President has said, we have a new baseline. Something which has never happened before. I don't know how the Palestinian delegation will be constituted. I hope we will be meeting with the Palestinians today, and that they will go to Aman afterwards. If we had been able to get the Palestinians issue behind us, it would have been better. The trouble is that everybody is looking at the T.V. stations and trying to satisfy their political needs. You have people on one side moving into houses, and then you have a trumped letter from the other side. Once we are able to arrange a talk, hopefully, we could move forward to a really lasting settlement. (C)

President Calderon: I think you have been absolutely great. The world has a sense of new tranquility with the end of the cold war. If you will be able to solve the Middle East crisis, then we will have the greatest period of tranquility in history. This would be the best thing you could leave to your grandchildren, to all our grandchildren. (C)

Secretary Baker: We will certainly do all we can. We'll see in the after mass of Central American developments, we are near the end of most regional problems. We have seen solutions in Nicaragua, in Afghanistan, and ***** in Cambodia. The Middle East problem is the toughest of all, and of course, we have the new problems, like Yugoslavia and Haiti. (C)

President Calderon: All this relates to our own sense of tranquility. Do you think President Gorbachev has been able to consolidate his position? (C)

Secretary Baker: He and Yeltsin are working together. Yeltsin is determined to sign a Union treaty. We think this is important. We need to have some authority to deal with the number one problem. We need to have some authority to deal with the nuclear problem. For example, the Ukrainians are saying that Ukraine is now independent and therefore the nuclear weapons that we have are ours. This argues for some center, some power to bring security to the nuclear problem. President Gorbachev has agreed to talk about how to settle the nuclear problem in the Ukraine. They want to do something, but that present situation is too dispersed and uncertain. We think it important to have a center with some authority. Yeltsin says, he agrees. Even though, some of the people around him may not. I've talked with both and each says that he's working closely with the other, but things need to be worked out. What will the center look like and how will it relate to the Republics? We have sent several delegations to the Soviet Union dealing with food and health. There is no agreement as to the problem. But, all agree that the distribution system is bad. There is a need to figure out to get from point A to Point B. We might see something less than perfect. We may get a strong center force. Not quite the Communist Party from before, but it could be bad. It will take time to sort out. Gorbachev has come back. He was weakened by his dialogue with Yeltsin where he was humiliated. But Yeltsin then seemed to say, hey, we really do need each other. But, the issue of the relations of the Republics to the center is used differently by different factions. We have the possibility of problems like in Yugoslavia. The Ukraine is acting very independent. And some Russian parts of the Ukraine are saying that they want independence, or a relationship with the Russian Republic. You could have a return to totalitarianism because of the desire for order. (C)

The President: The Baltic countries are crying for help. They are finding that going it alone as independents is tough. They had steel production, and now there is a question of where is the market for the steel. And they received energy from the other Republics, and it is a question where they will get it. (C)

President Calderon: It is the most serious problem--the independent actions of the Ukraine. (C)

The President: Brent, what do you think about that? (C)

General Scowcroft: The Ukraine is the biggest problem of an independent force, and there have been discussions where the Russian Republics would declare themselves (in charge of nuclear weapons?) Both of them should try to gather in their nuclear _____ and to get a mechanism for exercising control. The problem of breaking up nuclear forces within the Soviet Union. You could have internal proliferation. (C)

President Calderon: The big problem is will you have nuclear forces in various areas. (C)

The President: No. The weapons can be independently used. We don't know if they need to be connected with the central command. We do not think that strategic missiles could be launched, but, there may be a problem with tactical weapons. (C)

General Scowcroft: The weapons all have safety ***** to prevent firing, but this could be overcome with the application of local scientists. Another problem -- you could have Soviet scientist who are unemployed, who would put themselves up for sale to people like Khadafi and Hussein. There are all kinds of potential problems. (C)

The President: We are moving in the right direction, but problems remain. The good news is that they are being very responsive to our thoughts about reducing nuclear armaments. (C)

Minister of Finance Vargas: How do you look at new movement in Sweden? (C)

Foreign Minister Niehaus: ***** I would say a few words about the PDD. The EC has made a positive contribution. We think that contributions from other countries could play a big part in the development of the PDD. (C)

Assistant Secretary Aronson: The first meeting, which was held in Costa Rica, with Costa Rica hosting it, was a big success. The European community and Japanese contributed very helpfully to the meeting by their participation. They have begun to work together. (C)

The President: Could you give us your views on Cuba? (C)

President Calderon: I'm a natural optimist. I believe that's why I've run three times for President until I finally won. We think that democracies have turned the corner in the hemisphere. Actually, democracy has become an epidemic. It is spreading everywhere, even in the Soviet Union. There is no reason not to have change in Cuba. I have never dealt with Fidel before. We have had very little relationship with Cuba. I did see him in Guadalajara. I found him to be worn out, exhausted, and isolated

- the only dictator in a group of democracies. I believe that he is in the eclipse. I believe that he has passed the summit of his days. (C)

The President: Did he look old? (C)

President Calderon: Yes. What you heard about his vitality I didn't see. I did see that he was willing to discuss any views. I would think that we will until '93 when he will be gone. (C)

Secretary Baker: How will that happen? (C)

The President: It's hard to tell if he would step aside peacefully. I found it interesting that a foreign-policy-area conference-poll, and I think this was a poll of some 30,000 people, said in large part that they thought we should be willing to dialogue with Cuba even though he doesn't make any moves. It surprised me that the group would want to work with Castro. We won't do it, of course, but I was surprised that they would suggest this. (C)

President Calderon: It is interesting that a large part of the world has come to the western hemisphere's point of view. We were tough on the Sandinista Guerrilla's in Costa Rica. ***** because they **** a need for escalation. The firmness of Congress has undermined the Guerrillas. I think that it would be a big mistake to negotiate with Castro. He will have to be thrown out. It will happen. (C)

The President: I understand that he still has a very effective security apparatus with representatives of the apparatus on every block. It could be difficult to get rid of him. (C)

Baker may have something I didn't get.

The President: One thing, I think there are a lot of people in South Florida who would be willing to help with advise and investment if there were a new government in Cuba. People would want to help. (C)

(b)(1)

How are we doing on timing with the press. We don't like to get them irritated by keeping them waiting too long. Remember the telephone works so give me a call anytime you feel the need. We want to stay in touch. I want to tell you again, I admire your courage and seeing your economic reforms made, and I hope you

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will keep on. I have great respect for what you are doing.
Let's keep in contract. (C)

-- End of conversation --

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